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For many citizens, the American electoral system evokes images of vot-
ers casting their ballots in fair and open elections for candidates of their
choice. The Fourteenth1 and Fifteenth Amendments,2 which prohibit vot-
ing discrimination on the basis of race,3 cover every election conducted in
national and state politics.4 These amendments also outlaw discriminatory
practices that dilute minority votes.5 Despite the ratification of the Four-
teenth Amendment in 1868 and the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870, some
states continued to harass citizens, particularly blacks, who attempted to
exercise their constitutional right to vote. These states relied on less obvi-
ous but equally effective forms of discrimination-stuffing ballot boxes,6
gerrymandering electoral boundaries, 7  and enforcing grandfather
clauses"-to disenfranchise blacks. It was only after the Supreme Court's
decision in Baker v. Carr-holding that Tennessee's apportionment of
seats in its General Assembly was a justiciable issue-that citizens could
successfully challenge electoral schemes diluting their votes. Still, as re-
cently as 1963, five southern states levied poll taxes that had a significant
impact on black voter registration.1
1. U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[No State shall] deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.").
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condi-
tion of servitude.").
3. See, e.g., Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965).
4. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Hennings v. Grafton, 523 F.2d 861 (7th Cir. 1975).
5. See, e.g., Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 554-55; United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383, 386 (1915).
Racial vote dilution, often dubbed minority vote dilution, occurs whenever the combination of election
practices and bloc voting results in the diminution of the voting strength of a racial minority group.
Davidson, Minority Vote Dilution, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION 4 (C. Davidson ed. 1984).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 3F5 (1944); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879).
7. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347 (1960); see, e.g., Kousser, The Undermining of the
First Reconstruction: Lessons for the Second, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION, supra note 5, at
31-33.
8. See, e.g., Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275-77 (1939); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347,
364-65 (1915).
9. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
10. Matthews & Prothro, Political Factors and Negro Voter Registration in the South, 57 AM.
POL. Sm. REv. 355, 357-58 (1963).
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After many of these schemes had been exposed, the Supreme Court de-
veloped the one-person, one-vote doctrine' to deal comprehensively with
discriminatory electoral practices. Put generally, this doctrine emanates
from the "personal right to cast a vote that [is] the mathematical
equivalent of the vote cast by any other member of the same constitu-
ency."1 2 Deriving its analysis from the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amend-
ments,"3 the Court announced that the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment requires that every ballot be weighed equally:
one-person, one-vote. 4
Although many of the early one-person, one-vote cases were brought on
behalf of claimants alleging discrimination in legislative elections, the
Court generally expanded the scope of the principle to include the elec-
tions of other governmental officials.' 5 It refused, however, to extend the
rule to elections of state court judges. In Wells v. Edwards,6 the Supreme
Court affirmed without opinion the district court's decision that "the con-
cept of one-man, one-vote apportionment does not apply to the judicial
branch of the government."' 7 In essence, judges could be elected from dis-
tricts differing significantly in size.
While the Court applied the one-person, one-vote principle to ensure
equal populations in legislative-type elections, Congress passed the Voting
Rights Act of 1965"8 to deal with racial discrimination in all elections.' 9
The Act prohibits the use of discriminatory election practices nation-
wide. 0 Unlike their treatment of the one-person, one-vote principle, fed-
11. The Court and various commentators also have referred to the doctrine as the "one-man, one-
vote doctrine." Recognizing the 19th Amendment, the Court has refrained from using this formulation
since 1973. See infra note 13; Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 319, modified, 411 U.S. 922 (1973).
12. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrruTIONAL LAW § 13-3, at 1064 (2d ed. 1988). This principle
also guarantees that members of state legislatures represent roughly the same number of constituents.
See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 382 (1963)
(Stewart, J., concurring) ("Within a given constituency, there can be room for but a single constitu-
tional rule-one voter, one vote."); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
13. The Nineteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part: "The right of citizens of the United
States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
14. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. at 379-80.
15. See infra Section I(B).
16. 347 F. Supp. 453 (M.D. La. 1972), aff'd mem., 409 U.S. 1095 (1973).
17. 347 F. Supp. at 454; see Voter Information Project, Inc. v. City of Baton Rouge, 612 F.2d
208, 211 (5th Cir. 1980); Martin v. Mabus, 700 F. Supp. 327, 332 (S.D. Miss. 1988). It should be
noted that the petitioner in Wells relied upon principles of apportionment, not racial discrimination.
18. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to
1973bb-1 (1976)), amended by Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat.
131, 134 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1982)).
19. The goals of the Voting Rights Act are outlined in the Report of the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee. See S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 [hereinafter SENATE REPORT), reprinted in 1982
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 177, 182.
20. Section 2 of the amended Act provides, in pertinent part:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be
imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial




eral courts recently have applied the Act to state judicial elections2" when
such elections are challenged on grounds of racial discrimination. In both
Chisom v. Edwards22 and Mallory v. Eyrich,23 federal courts of appeals
have reversed district court holdings that the Act did not apply to elections
for state court judges.
This recent interpretation of the Voting Rights Act is important but,
unfortunately, not comprehensive. Under this interpretation, the Act fails
to protect adequately the voting rights of black 24 citizens casting ballots in
judicial elections, because it has been applied only to prohibit the debase-
ment of minority votes within discrete judicial electoral districts. The Act
has not been interpreted to outlaw the disproportionate allotment of
elected judges across a state;25 while the one-person, one-vote doctrine di-
rectly addresses this problem, the Court in Wells refused to extend this
doctrine to judicial elections. In effect, this loophole permits state election
officials bent on disenfranchising blacks to apportion judges so that white
citizens are "represented" by more judges than are black citizens. Al-
though this would not dilute the votes of blacks with respect to whites in
any one political subdivision-and therefore would not violate the stric-
tures of the Voting Rights Act as currently interpreted-it effectively
would reduce the influence of blacks on both judicial elections and state
court jurisprudence. In addition, unlike the one-person, one-vote doctrine,
the Act does not require that state governments maintain population devi-
ations between judicial districts below specific levels.26
Given these loopholes in voting rights advancements, this Note proposes
that courts extend the application of the one-person, one-vote standard to
judicial elections when such elections are challenged on grounds of racial
(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the totality of circum-
stances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or
political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens
protected by subsection (a) of this section in that its members have less opportunity than other
members of the electorate to participate in the political process ...
42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982).
21. Because most state constitutions allow state legislatures to draw independent districts for legis-
lative and judicial elections, the reconstruction of legislative boundaries to comply with § 2 had little
effect on judicial boundaries or elections, and claimants were forced to bring separate challenges tojudicial districting. See generally LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING RESEARCH FUND OF COLUMBIA UNIVER-
SITY, CONSTITUIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: NATIONAL AND STATE (1988) (survey of state
constitutions).
22. 839 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1988), rev'g 659 F. Supp. 183 (E.D. La. 1987), cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 390 (1988).
23. 839 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1988), rev'g 666 F. Supp. 1060 (S.D. Ohio 1987).
24. This Note discusses racial discrimination against black voters because violations of both the
one-person, one-vote doctrine and the Voting Rights Act have come primarily at the expense of blacks.
However, the discriminatory practices outlined in this Note have been used to dilute the votes of other
racial and ethnic minorities as well. As such, the proposal offered here should be interpreted to apply
to any such group claiming protection.
25. Courts recently interpreting the Act have dealt exclusively with jurisdictional boundaries, ig-
noring the number of judges located within each district. See infra text accompanying notes 75-78.
26. See, e.g., Martin v. Mabus, 700 F. Supp. 327, 331-32 (S.D. Miss. 1988). For a discussion of
de minimis deviations, see infra note 116 and accompanying text.
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discrimination.27 Section I will summarize the development of the one-
person, one-vote doctrine and its application to elected judges. Section II
will then introduce the practical limitations of this doctrine as applied to
racial discrimination cases, address the deficiencies of the Voting Rights
Act in remedying potential discrimination, and emphasize the importance
of proper judicial apportionment within the context of state court elec-
tions. Drawing upon this foundation, Section III will propose the adop-
tion of a close scrutiny standard in one-person, one-vote challenges to ju-
dicial elections based upon race.2 8
I. THE ONE-PERSON, ONE-VOTE PRINCIPLE
A. Origins of the Rule: The Decision to Enter the Political Thicket
In 1962, the Supreme Court first entered "the political thicket"2 of
reapportionment by deciding in Baker v. Carr that federal courts were
competent to hear equal protection challenges to schemes of apportion-
ment. The following year, the Court extended this holding to the realm of
substantive law by striking down a statewide primary system of election
that favored ballots cast in rural areas over those cast in urban areas. This
case, Gray v. Sanders,"0 constituted a great achievement in the develop-
ment of voting rights. Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, summa-
rized: "The conception of political equality from the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth,
and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing-one person, one
vote."31
The Court next extended this analysis to federal congressional districts
in Wesberry v. Sanders.2 There, the Court applied Article I, section 2 of
the Constitution-providing that representatives be selected "by the Peo-
ple of the several States"-to strike down statutes that created dispropor-
tionate electoral districts."3 "To say that a vote is worth more in one dis-
27. Of course, this problem would be resolved if the Court simply abandoned Wells and allowed
individuals to bring one-person, one-vote challenges to non-discriminatory judicial districts. See infra
note 51. This Note provides analytical support for such an abandonment. See infra Section II(0).
However, even under the current legal regime, this Note argues that district courts would not violate
the Wells doctrine by applying the one-person, one-vote principle to claims of racial discrimination in
judicial elections.
28. One important caveat must be added here. In no way does this Note recommend that each
state adopt elections as its method of selecting judicial officers. This Note argues simply that the one-
person, one-vote principle should apply in racial challenges to judicial elections in states that have
adopted elections as their method of judicial selection.
29. Justice Frankfurter was among the first to use this term. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S.
549, 556 (1946); see also id. at 552 (Court cannot strike down state apportionment scheme because of
scheme's "peculiarly political nature").
30. 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
31. Id. at 381.
32. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
33. Id. at 7-8. Claimants in Wesberry were citizens of Fulton County, Georgia, and were regis-
tered to vote in the Fifth Congressional District. This district was composed of 823,680 people, while
1196 [Vol. 98: 1193
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trict than in another would not only run counter to our fundamental ideas
of democratic government, it would cast aside the principle of a House of
Representatives elected 'by the People'. .. .
The final major development of the 1960s reapportionment revolution
came in Reynolds v. Sims.35 In Reynolds, the Court invalidated a state
legislative apportionment system 6 and held that "the Equal Protection
Clause requires both houses of a state legislature to be apportioned on a
population basis . . . ., On the same day, in Lucas v. Forty-Fourth
General Assembly, 38 the Court relied on Reynolds to rule that impermissi-
ble apportionment schemes cannot be preserved through a referendum of a
state's citizens.3 9
B. The Scope of the Rule
With the development of the one-person, one-vote rule, the Court had
to determine to which elections the rule applied. At first, the Court ex-
tended the rule to both houses of the state legislature in Reynolds and to
elected state executive officers in Gray v. Sanders.4 Plaintiffs attempted
to broaden further the application of the rule to other units of govern-
ment, and sometimes succeeded. One of the first attempts came in Sailors
v. Board of Education,"' where Michigan voters challenged the appor-
tionment of members of the county board of education as a violation of the
one-person, one-vote principle. The Court rejected this challenge for two
reasons. First, the one-person, one-vote rule did not apply because plain-
tiffs did not challenge the election of local school board officials, but in-
stead challenged the subsequent appointment of county officials.42 Second,
the rule did not apply because the offices challenged were "nonlegislative"
in nature.43
the average population of each district in Georgia was only 394,312. Id. at 2. In effect, then, members
of Congress from the Fifth District represented more than twice as many people as did the average
Georgia representative.
34. Id. at 8; see THE FEDERALIsT No. 57, at 351 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (electors of
members of Congress are to be great body of "the people" of United States).
35. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
36. Since the claimants challenged state legislative districting, they grounded their claim in the
equal protection clause, instead of Article I, § 2 of the Constitution. Id. at 537.
37. Id. at 576.
38. 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
39. Id. at 734-36; id. at 736 ("An individual's constitutionally protected right to cast an equally
weighted vote cannot be denied even by a vote of a majority of a State's electorate .... .
40. 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
41. 387 U.S. 105 (1967).
42. Id. at 106, 111. Delegates from local school boards, not school electors, appointed the county
school board members. Id. at 109.
43. Id. at 111. On the same day, the Court upheld an election scheme for Virginia Beach's city
council. Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112 (1967). In that case, the Court found it irrelevant that council
members were elected from disproportionately-sized boroughs because each council member repre-
sented the population of the entire city. Hence, the election practice did not violate the one-person,
one-vote rule.
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Plaintiffs were more successful in Avery v. Midland County,"4 in which
the Court applied to local governments the one-person, one-vote rule ex-
pounded in Reynolds v. Sims. Justice White, writing for the Court, an-
nounced another extension of the rule: "Our decision today is only that
the Constitution imposes one ground rule for the development of arrange-
ments of local government: a requirement that units with general govern-
mental powers over an entire geographic area not be apportioned among
single-member districts of substantially unequal population." '45 The fact
that the commissioners in Avery were able to make substantive decisions
affecting the entire community weighed heavily on the Court's decision to
strike down the districting scheme on the one-person, one-vote principle.4
The scope of this principle was clarified, finally, in Hadley v. Junior
College District."' There, the Court surveyed the existing case law on the
reach of the rule and concluded that even junior college school districts
must apportion representatives evenly. The Court based its holding on the
importance and complexity of the governmental powers granted to elected
junior college trustees.*" More important, however, was the standard the
Court declared to guide future decisions:
[Als a general rule, whenever a state or local government decides to
select persons by popular election to perform governmental functions,
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires
that each qualified voter must be given an equal opportunity to par-
ticipate in that election, and when members of an elected body are
chosen from separate districts, each district must be established on a
basis that will insure, as far as is practicable, that equal numbers of
voters can vote for proportionally equal numbers of officials."'
This standard currently forms the basis for whether the one-person, one-
vote standard applies to a specific type of election.50
C. The Hadley Standard and Elected Judges
During the development of the Hadley standard, plaintiffs attempted to
challenge judicial elections under the one-person, one-vote principle.
44. 390 U.S. 474 (1968). In Avery, a taxpayer brought suit to challenge the districting scheme of
county precincts of significantly differing populations.
45. Id. at 485-86 (emphasis supplied).
46. Id. at 484-86.
47. 397 U.S. 50 (1970).
48. Id. at 53-54.
49. Id. at 56.
50. This standard has been applied recently. See, e.g., Morris v. Board of Estimate, 707 F.2d 686
(2d Cir. 1983) (principle applies because board is selected by popular election and performs general
governmental functions), remanded, 647 F. Supp. 1463 (E.D.N.Y. 1986), affd, 831 F.2d 384, 388
(2d Cir. 1987) (clarifying requirements of equal protection clause), affd, 109 S. Ct. 1433 (1989);
Hurlbut v. Scheetz, 804 F.2d 462 (8th Cir. 1986) (equal protection clause requires application of one-
person, one-vote principle to elected school board).
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Many of these challenges have been systematically and, in the view of this
Note, mistakenly rebuffed by the federal courts.
The first such challenge came in Stokes v. Fortson,51 in which the
plaintiffs challenged Georgia statutes that governed the selection of elected
state judges. Those statutes allowed a majority of the state's voters to oust
a judge elected by a particular circuit.52 The plaintiffs alleged that this
scheme violated the one-person, one-vote principle.5" The court rejected
this claim, noting first that the Georgia election practice neither resulted
in discrimination among voters nor promoted unequal weighing of votes."
More important, however, was the court's second conclusion:
[E]ven assuming some disparity in voting power, the one man-one
vote doctrine, applicable as it now is to selection of legislative and
excutive [sic] officials, does not extend to the judiciary. Manifestly,
judges . . . are not representatives in the same sense as are legisla-
tors or the executive. Their function is to administer the law, not to
espouse the cause of a particular constituency.5"
Stokes served as the progenitor of a line of cases based upon precisely this
reasoning.56
Against this backdrop of unanimity, the Supreme Court heard one
equal protection challenge to these judicial elections. In Wells v. Ed-
wards,517 the district court held that "the concept of one-man, one-vote
apportionment does not apply to the judicial branch of the government."'58
51. 234 F. Supp. 575 (N.D. Ga. 1964) (per curiam). This case and others involving elected judges
are summarized in Note, The Equal-Population Principle: Does it Apply to Elected Judges?, 47
NOTRE DAME LAW. 316 (1971). This note reviewed the case law in existence before the Supreme
Court's decision in Wells, see supra note 16, infra notes 57-61 and accompanying text, and concluded
briefly that under some circumstances the one-person, one-vote principle should apply to the elected
judiciary. Neither this note nor the Court's decision, however, specifically addressed the question of
race in these elections.




56. Chronologically, these cases include Buchanan v. Rhodes, 249 F. Supp. 860, 865 (N.D. Ohio)
("Judges do not represent people, they serve people. They must, therefore, be conveniently located to
those people whom they serve."), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 3 (1966); New York State Ass'n of
Trial Lawyers v. Rockefeller, 267 F. Supp. 148, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (same); Kail v. Rockefeller,
275 F. Supp. 937 (E.D.N.Y. 1967) (presence of unequal court delay insufficient to require apportion-
ment on one-person, one-vote basis); De Kosenko v. New York, 311 F. Supp. 126, 129 (S.D.N.Y.
1969) (same), affd, 427 F.2d 351 (2d Cir. 1970); Holshouser v. Scott, 335 F. Supp. 928, 930-32, 934
(M.D.N.C. 1971) (republican form of government does not require election of state court judges; these
elections need not conform to one-person, one-vote standard), affd mem., 409 U.S. 807 (1972);
Buchanan v. Gilligan, 349 F. Supp. 569, 571 (N.D. Ohio 1972) (state judiciary not responsible for
achieving representative government); and Gilday v. Board of Elections, 472 F.2d 214, 217 (6th Cir.
1972) (one-person, one-vote principle not applicable to state judiciary).
57. 347 F. Supp. 453 (M.D. La. 1972), affld mem., 409 U.S. 1095 (1973).
58. 347 F. Supp. at 454. Some commentators also have argued that judges are wholly removed
from the processes of politics and, therefore, from the one-person, one-vote principle: "'They [courts
and judges] make no law, they establish no policy, they never enter into the domain of popular ac-
tion.'" H. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PRocmss 320 (3d ed. 1975) (statement of Justice David
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The Supreme Court summarily affirmed, over a sharp dissent by Justice
White, joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall. Justice White charged
that the Louisiana constitutional provision under attack led to severe pop-
ulation disparities between districts,59 and maintained that the Court's
line of decisions from Reynolds to Hadley supported the application of the
one-person, one-vote principle to judicial elections. Justice White also re-
lied upon the general rule derived from Hadley, which requires that any
election for an official performing governmental functions comply with the
one-person, one-vote doctrine.80 White argued that the district court's con-
struction of the phrase "persons . . .to perform governmental functions"
as limited to "officials who performed legislative or executive type duties"
was overly restrictive: "Judges are not private citizens who are sought out
by litigious neighbors to pass upon their disputes. They are state officials,
vested with state powers and elected (or appointed) to carry out the state
government's judicial functions. As such, they most certainly 'perform
governmental functions.' "61 The Court has not yet responded to Justice
White's analysis, but it is generally understood that apportionment princi-
ples do not extend to judicial elections.6 2
II. THE LIMITATIONS OF APPLYING PRINCIPLES OF RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION TO THE CURRENT ONE-PERSON, ONE-VOTE
DOCTRINE
After the Court affirmed Wells, lower federal courts deferred to the
Supreme Court's explication of the scope of the one-person, one-vote prin-
ciple.6" The courts, however, have interpreted Wells to preclude applica-
tion of the principle to any state judicial election, despite the Wells
Court's concern only with principles of apportionment and not racial dis-
crimination. Indeed, the line of cases discussed earlier" 4-from Stokes v.
Fortson to Gilday v. Board of Electors-does not consider in any detail
Brewer). Cf G. WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION 109-28 (expanded ed. 1988) (dis-
cussing relationship between politics and jurisprudence).
59. 409 U.S. at 1095 (White, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 1095-96 (quoting Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 56 (1970)). See Hadley,
397 U.S. at 55:
If there is any way of determining the importance of choosing a particular governmental offi-
cial, we think the decision of the State to select that official by popular vote is a strong enough
indication that the choice is an important one. This is so because in our country popular
election has traditionally been the method followed when government by the people is most
desired.
61. Wells, 409 U.S. at 1096-97 (White, J., dissenting).
62. See, e.g., Butler, Reapportionment, the Courts, and the Voting Rights Act: A Resegregation
of the Political Process?, 56 U. CoLo. L. REv. 1, 11 n.34 (1984); Charo, Designing Mathematical
Models to Describe One-Person, One-Vote Compliance by Unique Governmental Structures: The
Case of the New York City Board of Estimate, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 735, 762 n.166 (1985).
63. See, e.g., Voter Information Project v. City of Baton Rouge, 612 F.2d 208, 211 (5th Cir.
1980) (bound by Court's decision in Wells); Martin v. Mabus, 700 F. Supp. 327, 332 (S.D. Miss.
1988) (same).
64. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
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claims of racial discrimination. It is in this area that courts should apply
the one-person, one-vote principle to judicial elections.
A. Examining the Case Law
Many of the principles upon which the Court relied to develop the one-
person, one-vote principle-from Gray v. Sanders to Reynolds v.
Sims-were derived from early racial discrimination cases. In Gray v.
Sanders, for example, the Court relied upon Terry v. Adams65 and Ex
parte Yarbrough,6" both of which protected the right of black citizens to
cast a meaningful ballot. The Reynolds Court also cited Ex parte Yar-
brough and Terry v. Adams, as well as Guinn v. United States," Lane v.
Wilson,8 Gomillion v. Lighyfoot,6" Nixon v. Herndon'70 Nixon v. Con-
don 7 1 and Smith v. Allwright,72 each of which deals principally with is-
sues of racial discrimination. 73
Despite the subsequent elevation of the one-person, one-vote rule to a
fundamental right under the Constitution, the force of these early racial
discrimination cases should not be disregarded outside the apportionment
context. To be sure, the one-person, one-vote principle was extended to
apply to non-discrimination, apportionment cases, but its derivation from
the Fourteenth Amendment-which "was passed . . . with a special in-
tent to protect the blacks from discrimination against them" 7'-should not
be ignored simply because it was later subsumed within the framework of
non-discriminatory apportionment. When the Wells district court, for ex-
ample, rejected the application of the one-person, one-vote rule to judicial
elections, it relied upon principles of apportionment without contempora-
neously considering racial discrimination. It is precisely when racial dis-
crimination is at issue, however, that Wells-concerned only with issues
of apportionment-need not apply.
The circuit courts in both Mallory v. Eyrich and Chisom v. Edwards
65. 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (striking down white voter association's pre-primary because it deprived
black citizens of right to vote on account of race).
66. 110 U.S. 651 (1884) (Fifteenth Amendment confers right to vote upon all black citizens).
67. 238 U.S. 347 (1915) (state election officials who deprive blacks of right to vote are indictable
under state law).
68. 307 U.S. 268 (1939) (upholding statute imposing liability on persons who deprive blacks of
their right to vote).
69. 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (reversing district court's dismissal of case in which blacks' votes were
diluted through gerrymandering).
70. 273 U.S. 536 (1927) (black citizen may seek damages for denial of right to vote in primaries).
71. 286 U.S. 73 (1932) (same).
72. 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (forbidding party membership discrimination that prohibited blacks from
voting in primaries).
73. Justice O'Connor recently made a similar point in her concurrence in Davis v. Bandemer, 478
U.S. 109 (1986) (Indiana Democrats did not satisfy threshold showing of discriminatory vote dilu-
tion). Justice O'Connor argued that the Court's line of "racial gerrymandering cases" provides unique
protection for the victims of racial discrimination. Id. at 151-52 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
74. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 541 (1927); see Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303
(1879); The Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
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recognized the distinction between racial discrimination and apportion-
ment, but refused to consider its implications because they were able to
decide these cases on statutory grounds." In Mallory, for instance, the
court noted that the one-person, one-vote principle enunciated in Reynolds
v. Sims concerned "the population of different voting districts, not their
racial composition. 17  The court then justified its decision to ignore the
apportionment cases, noting that the plaintiffs brought a claim under the
Voting Rights Act, not under the one-person, one-vote principle.7 7 Simi-
larly, the Chisom court concluded that
the district court's reliance on Wells . . .is nrisplaced as we are not
concerned with a complaint seeking reapportionment of judicial dis-
tricts on the basis of population deviations between districts. Rather,
the complaint in the instant case involves claims of racial discrimina-
tion resulting in vote dilution under section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act .... 71
Each court properly refused to deal with the constitutional issue of one-
person, one-vote, largely because the case could be decided on section 2
grounds. Nonetheless, the relief awarded by courts in response to plain-
tiffs who successfully rely upon the Voting Rights Act (such as the plain-
tiffs in Chisom and Mallory) may be illusory if election officials are later
able to circumvent the Voting Rights Act by allocating more judges in
certain areas without diluting popular votes across the state.
B. The Potential for Malapportionment
There are no pending one-person, one-vote cases that charge state offi-
cials with malapportioning judges to circumvent the strictures of the Vot-
ing Rights Act. This is not surprising and does not suggest that state offi-
cials may not have powerful incentives to act in such a manner in the near
future. Until recently, state officials bent on electoral discrimination were
not compelled to rely upon the type of malapportionment discussed in this
Note, for they could simply define judicial districts in a manner that di-
luted the votes of black citizens. Two district courts had rejected claims
that section 2 of the Voting Rights Act79-prohibiting vote dilution based
upon race-protected blacks casting ballots in judicial elections. 80 Only
75. Cf Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., con-
curring) (Court will not pass on constitutional question when it can properly dispose of case on
statutory grounds).
76. 839 F.2d 275, 277-78 (6th Cir. 1988).
77. Id. at 278.
78. 839 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 390 (1988).
79. See supra note 20.
80. Mallory v. Eyrich, 666 F. Supp. 1060 (S.D. Ohio 1987), rev'd, 839 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1988);
Chisom v. Edwards, 659 F. Supp. 183 (E.D. La. 1987), rev'd, 839 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 390 (1988). These courts held that Congress's use of the word "representatives" in the
1202 [Vol. 98: 1193
1989] Judicial Elections 1203
recently were these decisions reversed on appeal.81 These reversals now
require election officials who seek to undervalue black votes to devise elec-
toral methods that satisfy both the strictures of section 2 and the one-
person, one-vote doctrine. Because of the current limitations on the one-
person, one-vote doctrine,82 state officials need only apportion state judges
disproportionately without altering judicial districts in order to satisfy the
strictures of section 2 and to preserve an unbalanced judicial scheme. The
votes of blacks in any single district would not be diluted; instead, pre-
dominately black areas simply would be assigned fewer judges than pre-
dominately white areas.83 State officials may even justify this apportion-
ment scheme, under the current case law, by claiming that large caseloads
(in white areas) demand more judges.8 4 Nonetheless, substantial dispari-
ties between districts should lead courts to consider whether the one-
person, one-vote principle should be applied to judicial elections when ra-
cial discrimination is established.85
Voting Rights Act indicated that § 2 did not apply to judges, who, "by their very definition, do not
represent voters. . . ." Chisom, 659 F. Supp. at 186; see Mallory, 666 F. Supp. at 1062-63. But see
Martin v. Allain, 658 F. Supp. 1183, 1200 (S.D. Miss. 1987) ("The use of the word 'representatives'
in Section 2 is not restricted to legislative representatives but denotes anyone selected or chosen by
popular election from among a field of candidates to fill an office, including judges."). Before 1987,
however, no federal court had invalidated a judicial election scheme for violating § 2 of the Voting
Rights Act.
81. Approximately one year ago, the Fifth Circuit concluded in Chisom that, since elected judges
are "candidates for public or party office" and are elected by popular vote, as described in the Act,
their elections are covered by § 2. 839 F.2d at 1060, 1059. This analysis followed directly from the
Senate Report, which emphasized that the right of a qualified voter to cast a ballot in any election is
protected from vote dilution under the newly adopted results test. SENATE REPORT, supra note 19, at
2; 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 177, 179 ("S. 1992 amends Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 to prohibit any voting practice, or procedure results [sic] in discrimination.")
(emphasis supplied). One of the original purposes of the Voting Rights Act was to outlaw discrimina-
tory practices nationwide by defending a minority group's equal access to the ballot box. SENATE
REPORT, supra note 19, at 6; 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 183. The focus of the
amended Act is the political process leading to any elected office. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 19,
at 7-9; 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 184-86 (discussing extensions of Voting Rights
Act and ability to vote); SENATE REPORT, supra note 19, at 16; 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 193 (identifying equal access to electoral processes as crucial question for judicial inquiry);
SENATE REPORT, supra note 19, at 19; 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 196 (mentioning
Reynolds and "the right to have the ballot counted"); SENATE REPORT, supra note 19, at 28; 1982
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 205 (affirming right to have vote count fully); SENATE RE-
PORT, supra note 19, at 33; 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 211 (discussing right of
minority voters "to participate meaningfully in elections"). Employing similar logic, the Sixth Circuit
reached the same comclusion in Mallory. 839 F.2d at 277-81.
82. See supra Section I(B).
83. For a discussion of the potential problems of at-large voting, see infra note 131.
84. The justifications for such claims will be discussed infra text accompanying notes 119 & 120.
85. This is not to suggest that every deviation from the average constitutes discrimination per se.
See infra Section III(A). However, states with judicial districts composed of substantially different
numbers of citizens-divided along racial lines-should be forced to justify their schemes of appor-
tionment. Such apportionment schemes exist. Indeed, despite the fact that until recently the legality of
racial gerrymandering made malapportionment unnecessary, there is evidence suggesting that at least
some electoral districts provide more judges in predominantly white areas than in black areas. In
Alabama's predominantly black Fourth Judicial District, for example, there are two judges for the
115,075 citizens. BNA's DIRECTORY OF STATE COURTS, JUDGES, AND CLERKS 2 (2d ed. 1988)
[hereinafter BNA's DIRECTORY]; U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, COUNTY AND CITY DATA BOOK
18 (1983) [hereinafter DATA BOOK]. These data are based upon the number of citizens present in
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C. The Importance of Proper Judicial Apportionment and
Representation
The significance of this observation-that current antidiscrimination
law does not adequately prevent the underrepresentation of blacks in judi-
cial elections-becomes apparent when the roles of state judges are consid-
ered. As both the Chisom and Mallory courts recognized, elected judges
can be regarded as "representatives" within the meaning of the Voting
Rights Act.86 Each court concluded that the representative character of
state judges stems from their popular election. 7 However, neither court
considered whether state judicial elections make judges more responsive to
the actual political beliefs of their constituents.88 Such a consideration be-
comes crucial when assessing the consequences of malapportionment: If
officials are allowed to devalue black votes through apportionment
schemes designed to reduce the number of judges in predominantly black
districts, black citizens will be less able than white citizens to influence the
direction of jurisprudence in their judicial districts.89
each electoral district (as determined by the last census) and the number of judges seated in each
district. Thus, each judge in this district serves approximately 57,538 citizens. In contrast, Alabama's
predominantly white Sixth Judicial District elects five judges who serve 137,541 citizens, which
amounts to 27,508 citizens per judge. See BNA's DIRECTORY, supra, at 3; DATA BOOK, supra, at 18.
As a result, white citizens in the Sixth Judicial District are more closely represented than are black
citizens in the Fourth Judicial District.
Similar statistics exist in another state that conducts partisan elections of its judges: Each judge in
North Carolina's predominantly white First District represents approximately 45,000 citizens, while
the only judge in the predominantly black Sixth District represents approximately 122,000 citizens.
See BNA's DIRECTORY, supra, at 230-31; DATA BOOK, supra, at 396. Again, these data do not
prove discrimination, but simply demonstrate that, in some areas, blacks are not as closely represented
by judges as are whites. States establishing such districts should be compelled to justify these dispari-
ties. See infra Section III(A).
86. Chisom v. Edwards, 839 F.2d 1056, 1061-63 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 390 (1988);
Mallory v. Eyrich, 839 F.2d 275, 279-81 (6th Cir. 1988).
87. Chisom, 839 F.2d at 1063 (characterizing representative as anyone selected by popular elec-
tion); Mallory, 839 F.2d at 278 (emphasizing act of voting). Commentators have also recognized that
elected state judges derive legitimacy from the fact that a majority of voters has authorized them to
serve the public. Stated simply, "[t]he composition and division of the electorate is crucial ...
[T]he legitimacy of judicial institutions, processes, and decisions may turn in part on citizen participa-
tion in the election of judges. Both the size and the composition of judicial electorates bear on the
legitimacy of the state courts." Adamany & Dubois, Electing State Judges, 1976 Wis. L. REV. 731,
736 (emphasis supplied); see Bell, Principles and Methods of Judicial Selection in France, 61 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1757, 1775 (1988) ("[I]f the judges seek to apply values which are not just their own,
but which are typical of a consensus in society (or perhaps in a relevant section of the community),
then the decisions will be authoritative and considered legitimate.").
88. A stark characterization of the relationship between elections and judicial responsiveness was
offered by former California Justice Otto Kaus, who, in discussing one case he heard, remarked: "I
decided the . . . case the way I saw it . . . . But to this day, I don't know to what extent I was
subliminally motivated by the thing you could not forget-that it might do you some good politically
to vote one way or the other." L.A. Times, Sept. 28, 1986, § I, at 23, col. 2. West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals Justice Richard Neely also has observed this phenomenon, noting that "the way in
which state judges get their jobs has a major impact on the outcome of lawsuits." R. NEELY, THE
PRODUCT LIABILTY MEss: How BUSINESS CAN BE RESCUED FROM STATE COURT PoLrrIcs 26
(1988). See Wold & Culver, The Defeat of the California Justices. The Campaign, the Electorate,
and the Issue of Judicial Accountability, 70 JUDICATURE 348, 351 (1987).
89. On a normative level, this Note expresses no opinion as to whether elected judges should be
responsive to their "constituents." It does posit, however, that judicial elections give judicial candidates
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A brief comparison of the federal and state judiciary illustrates the rep-
resentative qualities possessed by elected state judges seeking to satisfy
constituents. On the one hand, the Constitution requires that the Presi-
dent nominate, and the Senate approve, all federal judges,90 and it permits
these judges to hold office during time of good behavior.91 Exempt from
election, federal judges are not directly accountable to the people.92 Con-
versely, the fact that states may adopt appointment, merit selection,93 or
various other election schemes9" discredits the notion that state judges are
as detached from politics as are their federal counterparts.95 Because
powerful incentives to act responsively to their constituents, and therefore, to some degree, to "re-
present" them. The question addressed by this Note, then, is not whether judges should be elected.
Instead, it asks whether state officials should be allowed to apportion judges and reduce the influence
of black voters vis-a-vis white voters on state court jurisprudence given a system of elected judges and
the consequent representative qualities that these judges possess.
90. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
91. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
92. See, e.g., P. DUBOIS, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH 20-28 (1980); Kurland, The Constitution
and the Tenure of Federal Judges: Some Notes from History, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 665, 667 (1969);
Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1105, 1127-28 & n.80 (1977). Benjamin Cardozo,
however, criticized the traditional argument that judges are merely law-appliers: "Everywhere," wrote
Cardozo, "there is growing emphasis on the analogy between the function of the judge and the func-
tion of the legislator." B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 119 (1921); see also P.
DUBOIS, supra, at 23 ("[Jludges not only make conscious policy choices in the adjudication of cases
and in the exercise of the power of judicial review, but also engage in political decision-making as a
matter of function."). The Legal Realists also attacked the notion that any judge can act entirely
without regard to lawmaking. See, e.g, J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 32-41 (1936).
These critics challenged the oracular theory of judging, developed in this country largely by Chief
Justice Marshall, which held that judges properly "'found' rather than 'made' law ... " G. WHITE,
supra note 58, at 47.
93. Merit selection is a process whereby a nominating commission, consisting of members ap-
pointed by the governor, supplies a list of qualified nominees from which the governor must make his
appointment. In a typical merit selection system, following a judge's appointment by the governor,
voters have the option of retaining or rejecting each individual judge when his term expires. P. Du-
BOIS, supra note 92, at 4. For a recent defense of the merit selection plan, see Hill, Taking Texas
Judges Out of Politics: An Argument for Merit Election, 40 BAYLOR L. REV. 339 (1988) (written by
former Chief Justice of Texas Supreme Court).
94. Eligible voters in ten states-Alabama, Arkansas, Illinois, Mississippi, New Mexico, North
Carolina, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia-may cast a ballot in partisan elections
for judges on the State Supreme Court. Applebome, Texas Court Fight Puts Focus on Elected Judges,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1988, at B4, col. 3. In partisan elections, voters are provided with the party
label for each judicial candidate on the ballot. Conversely, thirteen states-Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, Ohio, Oregon, North Dakota, Washington, and
Wisconsin-have adopted non-partisan elections for positions on the State Supreme Court, and the
remaining states use some form of appointment. Id. This abstract is painted with a broad brush:
Because of the unique selection procedures in each state-and the fact that states may elect some
judges and appoint others-it is not possible to generalize with any degree of precision about each
state's election practices. For a more detailed description of the electoral systems used by each state,
see 27 THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 163-65 (1988) [herein-
after BOOK OF STATES].
95. See P. DUBOIS, supra note 92, at 20. The debate regarding elected judges is summarized
neatly in 4 THE REFERENCE SHELF, ELECTION VERSUS APPOINTMENT OF JUDGES (L. Beman ed.
1926). Indeed, the Jacksonian movement toward broadened suffrage and popular control led to the
adoption of electoral systems for judges in many states. L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN
LAW 126-27 (2d ed. 1985). But cf THE FE.zFRALwsn No. 78, at 471 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed.
1961) (If the power to elect judges were given to the people, "there would be too great a disposition to
consult popularity to justify a reliance that nothing would be consulted but the Constitution and the
laws.").
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judges may be removed from the bench in state elections, Burt Neuborne
has posited that "when arguable grounds supporting the majoritarian po-
sition exist, state trial judges are far more likely to embrace them than are
federal judges."9 Indeed, elections produce judges who may be more re-
sponsive to the concerns of the people than are appointed judges.97
Of course, the amount of pressure felt by a state court judge in render-
96. Neuborne, supra note 92, at 1128; see P. DuBois, supra note 92, at 31 (elected judges must
respond to their constituents or be defeated); Jacob, Judicial Insulation-Elections, Direct Participa-
tion, and Public Attention to the Courts in Wisconsin, 1966 Wis. L. REV. 801, 801; Ladinsky &
Silver, Popular Democracy and Judicial Independence: Electorate and Elite Reactions to Two Wis-
consin Supreme Court Elections, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 128; Nagel, Political Party Affiliation and
Judges' Decisions, 55 Am. POL. Sci. REV. 843, 849 (1961). Of course, it should be acknowledged that
even appointed judges, whether federal or state, may be compelled to temper their political beliefs
during the appointment process. Partisanship plays a major role in the selection (or rejection) of
federal judges; the recent nomination and confirmation battie of Judge Robert Bork demonstrates the
importance of judicial ideology as well as competence. Likewise, it is hardly insignificant that nearly
all the federal judges named since the Civil War have been nominated from the President's party.
Adamany & Dubois, supra note 87, at 773-74; see S. NAGEL, COMPARING ELECTED AND AP-
POINTED JUDICIAL SYSTEaMS 24 (American Politics Series No. 04-001, 1973). By 1987, more than
93% of President Reagan's judicial appointments were Republicans, compared with President Carter's
appointments, approximately 92% of whom were Democrats. Goldman, Reagan's Second TermJudi-
cidal Appointments: The Battle at Midway, 70 JUDICATURE 324, 328 (1987). Politics are no less
important in state appointments: Most appointed state judges are also named from the governor's
party. Adamany & Dubois, supra note 87, at 774. See S. NAGEL, supra, at 24. One commentator has
written that "'[i]t is well known that those who achieve the appointed bench often move through the
same political channels, i.e., you know the Governor, or you know someone who knows the Governor,
as those who reach the bench by way of the elective process.'" Vance, Elected or Appointed, Our
Judges Are Still Politicians: The 'Independence of the Judiciary' Lies in the Eyes of the Beholder,
L.A. Daily J., Sept. 5, 1983, at 4, col. 3.
97. One commentator hypothesizes that state elected judges often make decisions that reflect spe-
cific views held by their communities. Gibson, Environmental Constraints on the Behavior ofJudges:
A Representational Model of Judicial Decision Making, 14 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 343, 358 (1980).
According to this study, the sentencing behavior of elected judges is correlated directly to the nature of
their communities. This analysis is supported further by the fact that sentencing variations within
individual counties are demonstrably smaller than variations across counties. This is not to suggest
that only elected judges are sensitive to community pressure. However, elections provide direct incen-
tives for judges to consider community sentiments before deciding prominent cases. Cf A. BENTLEY,
THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT 393 (1949) (judicial responsiveness to public pressure is evidence of
this representation). Furthermore, Beverly Cook and Walter Markham found correlations between
sentences for draft evasion and characteristics of different judicial districts. Cook, Sentencing Behavior
of Federal Judges: Draft Cases-1972 , 42 U. CIN. L. REv. 597 (1973); W. Markham, Draft Of-
fenders in the Federal Courts: A Search for the Social Correlates of Justice (1972) (Ph.D. disserta-
tion, University of Pennsylvania). Conversely, because federal judges cannot be held accountable
through elections for their decisions, their jurisprudence tends to reflect the ideology of the appointing
President. S. GOLDMAN & T. JAHNIGE, THE FEDERAL COURTS AS A POLITICAL SYSTEM 76 n.80,
134-84 (3d ed. 1985).
It also should be noted that the sociological characteristics of state judges can be correlated with
their decisions. One study concluded, for example, that Democratic judges tend to exhibit greater
support than Republican judges for criminal defendants. D. Bowen, The Explanation of Judicial
Voting Behavior from Sociological Characteristics of Judges 57-58 (1965) (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale
University). Bowen's finding discredits the Mallory district court's pronouncement that all litigants
can expect similar treatment in state court, regardless of a judge's race, politics, or religion. See Mal-
lory v. Eyrich, 666 F. Supp. 1060, 1063 (S.D. Ohio 1987) ("No one can seriously assert that white
litigants should fare better before a white elected judge and black litigants . . . under a black elected
judge."), rev'd, 839 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1988). However, two commentators recently opined that a
federal judge's race has little effect upon her jurisprudence, though they also acknowledged the statis-
tical limitations of their analysis. Walker & Barrow, The Diversification of the Federal Bench: Policy
and Process Ramifications, 47 J. POL. 596, 608, 615 (1985).
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ing a decision will be influenced directly by the method of judicial election
utilized by the individual state. judges elected by partisan election"8 are
most susceptible to direct pressure.99 In states holding a combination of
non-partisan selection and retention elections,' 00 and in states with merit
retention systems, 01 it is much more difficult for voters to cast ballots
based upon party ideology.'0 2 Even in these elections, nonetheless, politics
still plays a role in judicial elections, and thereby challenges judicial
independence. 03
These methods of judicial selection all touch directly upon issues of
politics and representation.'" As a result, elected judges must be appor-
98. See BOOK OF STATES, supra note 94, at 163-65 (listing methods of selection and retention of
judges for each state).
99. In states employing a partisan ballot, voters tend to cast ballots along party lines. Adamany &
Dubois, supra note 87, at 760; see also P. DUBOIS, supra note 92, at 144 (partisan elections clearly
structure voter choices). A survey conducted of states using the partisan ballot indicates that the mean
party correlation between gubernatorial and judicial elections is substantial. Id. at 74-75. Further-
more, partisan elections compel judges to rely indirectly on party apparatuses for support. Id. at 148.
Party organizers also supply the organization and resources needed to finance a successful campaign.
Without these resources, a candidate may lose to a well-heeled opponent; with them, a judicial candi-
date may carry significant debts, both financial and personal, to the bench. See Applebome, supra
note 94 (Texas Supreme Court Justices criticized for accepting campaign contributions from Pennzoil
before refusing to hear appeal of $10.53 billion judgment for Pennzoil); see also R. NEELY, supra
note 88, at 62 (local plaintiffs, who can vote in state judicial elections, enjoy advantage in state court
over out-of-state defendants, who "can't even be relied upon to send a campaign contribution.").
100. BOOK OF STATES, supra note 94. Generally, two variations of the non-partisan election
exist: first, the partisan election followed by non-partisan retention elections (mixed system), and
second, the non-partisan election followed by non-partisan retention (pure system). In a mixed system,
voters are provided with a party label for the initial election but are given no such guidance in subse-
quent elections. P. DuBois, supra note 92, at 81, 89.
101. See BOOK OF STATES, supra note 94.
102. P. DUBOIS, supra note 92, at 75-77; see Adamany, The Party Variable in Judges' Voting:
Conceptual Notes and a Case Study, 63 AM. PoL Sci. Rav. 57, 69-71 (1969). But see Adamany &
Dubois, supra note 87, at 760 ("In states, such as Michigan and Ohio, with significant elements of
partisanship in nominating procedures and campaigning, but with nonpartisan election ballots, votes
are cast mainly along party lines."). Perhaps most important in this calculus is the fact that few
judges are defeated in retention campaigns. Hall & Aspin, What Twenty Years of Judicial Retention
Elections Have Told Us, 70 JUDICATURE 340, 346 (1987); see Lovrich & Sheldon, Voters in Judicial
Elections: An Attentive Public or an Uninformed Electorate?, 9 JUST. Sys. J. 23, 24-25 (1984).
103. The politics that may be involved in the merit retention system can be illuminated by briefly
examining the popular campaign to unseat California Supreme Court Chief Justice Rose Bird in the
1986 California retention election. Perhaps the primary issue leading to Justice Bird's defeat was her
record in criminal cases. Critics charged that she had been soft on criminals and had refused to
implement the death penalty where warranted. Wold & Culver, supra note 88, at 349-50. The cam-
paign literature used by these critics to remove Justice Bird was highly political. One piece of litera-
ture sent to California voters inquired whether "'you want a Supreme Court that will be dominated
by the extremist left-wing philosophy of Jerry Brown, Tom Hayden, and Jane Fonda?'" Id. at 350.
Pre-election spending resembled an ordinary campaign among senators and representatives: Pro- and
anti-Bird forces spent approximately seven and one-half million dollars on the retention election. Id.
at 350-51. For a summary of this campaign, see Thompson, Judicial Retention Elections and Judi-
cial Method: A Retrospective on the California Retention Election of 1986, 61 S. CAL. L. REv.
2007, 2036-42 (1988). But see Hall & Aspin, supra note 102, at 342 (retention elections are typically
uneventful; fewer than fifty trial judges have been defeated in last 50 years).
The merit selection scheme can be quite political in at least one respect: Governors typically nomi-
nate to merit selection commissions individuals who share their political philosophies. Consequently,
the list of qualified candidates compiled by most commissions tends to resemble any list the governor
would create independently.
104. Nagel, supra note 96, at 850:
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tioned evenly to ensure that they "represent" a valid cross-section of the
community. Unlike the federal process, state judges may be forced either
to explain their judicial philosophies to the electorate (through their elec-
tion committees) or to temper their jurisprudence for the next election.
Neither response facilitates an independent or detached state judiciary.
Both are characteristic of the "governmental functions" performed by
elected judges, and both help explain why the one-person, one-vote princi-
ple should be extended to judicial elections when, particularly in racial
discrimination cases, these elections are challenged.
III. THE PROPOSAL: EXTENDING THE ONE-PERSON, ONE-VOTE
PRINCIPLE TO RACIALLY DISCRIMINATORY APPORTIONMENT SYSTEMS
Refusing to extend the one-person, one-vote principle to elected judges
undermines recent advances in antidiscrimination law. The newly
amended Voting Rights Act prohibits the dilution of votes based upon race
by regulating the popular composition of discrete judicial districts. What it
has not regulated, however, is the number of judges assigned to each dis-
trict.1"5 Indeed, federal courts thus far have relied on the Supreme Court's
decision in Wells in refusing to apply the one-person, one-vote principle to
judicial elections.106 This Note has argued that such reliance is misplaced,
because the Court in Wells was not presented with discrimination based
upon race; it simply considered the presumptively race-neutral allocation
of judges within a state. The Note has also traced the history of the one-
person, one-vote principle, and determined that some of the earliest rele-
vant cases extended the principle to cases involving racial discrimina-
tion.107 These analyses suggest that courts considering racial discrimina-
tion claims should not simply defer to Wells, but should instead determine
whether a separate standard applies to one-person, one-vote cases based
upon race.
Regardless of judicial tenure and modes of selection, there probably will always be a residue of
party-correlated judicial subjectivity so long as political parties are at least partly value-
oriented and so long as court cases involve value-oriented controversies. Ultimately the problem
becomes not how to remove this irreducible residue of judicial subjectivity, but rather what
direction it take should [sic].
For a similar view, see Thompson, supra note 103, at 2062 ("As governors . . . come to view the
bench as the area in which there [sic] partisan philosophies will be carried out over the long run by
judges deciding cases to advance a political agenda, retention elections can become more and more
partisan.").
105. Nor has it required that judicial districts conform to the de minimis variance doctrine. Mar-
tin v. Mabus, 700 F. Supp. 327, 332 (S.D. Miss. 1988); for a discussion of this doctrine, see infra
note 116 and accompanying text.
106. See supra note 63.
107. See supra notes 65-72 and accompanying text.
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A. The Standard
This Note proposes that courts closely scrutinize discriminatory judicial
election systems that violate the one-person, one-vote principle. This ap-
proach comports with the Fourteenth Amendment by guaranteeing the
equal protection of the fundamental right to vote.""8 Such a test would
proceed along typical lines of a close scrutiny analysis in voting rights
challenges: Judicial apportionment schemes that have "a real and appreci-
able impact on the exercise of the franchise . . . must be 'closely scruti-
nized' and found reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of legitimate
state objectives in order to pass constitutional muster." 09
Under traditional equal protection analysis, claimants may not chal-
lenge a law simply because it adversely affects them; rather they must
demonstrate the existence of intentional discrimination.110 This require-
ment presumably also applies to challenges of judicial election schemes.'
However, in the voting rights area, the Court has allowed proof of intent
to be introduced through "indirect" evidence: "'Necessarily, an invidious
discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the rele-
vant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the law bears more heavily
on one race than another.' "1 2 Indeed, in formulating the one-person,
one-vote doctrine, the Supreme Court has emphasized the numerical dis-
crepancies between districts rather than intent. The notion of discrimina-
tory intent was not stressed in the Court's Reynolds conclusion: "[Ajn
individual's right to vote for state legislators is unconstitutionally impaired
when its weight is in a substantial fashion diluted when compared with
108. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (invalidating poll tax as violative
of equal protection clause); cf Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (right to vote is
fundamental because it is preservative of all other rights). See generally Wall, Equal Protection:
Analyzing the Dimensions of a Fundamental Right-The Right to Vote, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
163 (1977).
109. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 144 (1972). But cf. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971
Term-Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer
Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) (heightened scrutiny may be "'strict' in theory [but]
fatal in fact . . . ."). Conversely, if an election system does not have a "real or appreciable impact"
on the exercise of the franchise, it would be subject only to "rational basis" scrutiny, in which the
government would have to prove only that the system has a "rational basis." See In re Objections to
Nomination Petition of Cavanaugh, 65 Pa. Commw. 620, 636-37, 444 A.2d 1308, 1311 (1982). It is
clear, however, that an apportionment scheme that allocates judges based upon race would have a
"real or appreciable impact" on the ability of blacks to vote for candidates of their choice.
110. See, e.g., Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976).
111. See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265; Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 240 (showing of
discriminatory intent required in all equal protection cases).
112. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 618 (1982) (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 242).
In Rogers, the Court affirmed a district court's finding that voting officials conducted at-large elec-
tions for the invidious purpose of diluting black voting strength. The Court noted that although blacks
constituted a majority in the challenged district, they constituted a distinct minority of registered vot-
ers. In addition, the existence of bloc voting along racial lines and the absence of black elected officials
led the court to conclude that "[tihese facts bear heavily on the issue of purposeful discrimination."
458 U.S. at 623 (emphasis supplied).
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votes of citizens living in other parts of the State."1 3 Similar language
appearing a few pages later in Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assem-
bly11 led Professor Tribe to write that "Lucas imposed upon the state the
burden of justifying deviations from the equal population standard. The
imposition of this burden was of singular practical importance, given the
difficulty of proof and argument in matters so elusive as proper
representation. '1
Essentially, plaintiffs challenging state apportionment schemes must
demonstrate the existence of significant population disparities in order to
maintain an action.'" Once this showing has been made, the state may
present evidence-as a defense to disproportionate districting-that dis-
crepancies are necessary in order to achieve a legitimate state goal. 11
Such evidence will not be dispositive if the announced goal does not neces-
sitate the current level of deviation.'
Perhaps the most legitimate state objective served by malapportionment
of elected judges is the importance of locating judges in areas where their
services are required. To be sure, judges must "be conveniently located to
those people whom they serve. Location, then, is one of many significant
factors which the legislature may properly consider when carrying out its
constitutional mandate to create an effective judicial system.""' 9 Many
courts relied upon this factor in dismissing one-person, one-vote claims in
disputed judicial elections.' 2
Nonetheless, it is not clear that this factor should, without further anal-
ysis, be "found reasonably necessary" to achieve legitimate state ends in
every district. Courts must ascertain in each case whether the speedy ad-
ministration of justice requires the apportionment of more judges in juris-
dictions predominantly composed of white citizens, instead of simply oper-
113. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964); see id. at 579. The Reynolds Court went on to
hold that "the Equal Protection Clause requires that a State make an honest and good faith effort to
construct districts, in both houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal population as is practicable." Id.
at 577. Again, intent plays no role in this calculation. This emphasis on numerical consistency has
been followed well after Washington v. Davis. See, e.g., Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983).
114. 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
115. L. TRIBE, supra note 12, § 13-3, at 1066.
116. As a general matter, courts tolerate disparities of less than 10% as acceptable de minimis
deviations. See, e.g., Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842 (1983) (deviations of 10% in state legisla-
tive districts permissible); Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 418 (1977) (deviations below 10% permissi-
ble); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 750-51 (1973) (deviations of 7.83% in Connecticut legisla-
tive districts permissible). "[L]arger disparities in population, however, createf] a prima facie case of
discrimination and therefore must be justified by the State." Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. at 842-43;
see Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 531 (1969); Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440, 444 (1967);
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562-63 (1964).
117. Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. at 843; Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 328, modified, 411
U.S. 922 (1973); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. at 579.
118. Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120, 123 (1967).
119. Buchanan v. Rhodes, 249 F. Supp. 860, 865 (N.D. Ohio 1966).
120. See Holshouser v. Scott, 335 F. Supp. 928, 932 (M.D.N.C. 1971); New York State Ass'n of
Trial Lawyers v. Rockefeller, 267 F. Supp. 148, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Stokes v. Fortson, 234 F.
Supp. 575, 577 (N.D. Ga. 1964).
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ating under this assumption."'1 This assessment becomes critical in
jurisdictions predominantly composed of minorities who may face over-
crowded dockets in their own districts. In order to deal with such dockets,
courts may be compelled to limit the discovery process, or minorities may
be forced to take their cases to other districts (assuming liberal venue re-
quirements) to appear before judges chosen by an entirely different con-
stituency."' All these measures substantially impair the certainty of jus-
tice for black citizens who reside in these unequal districts.
B. Why Close Scrutiny?
This Note advocates the adoption of a close scrutiny standard in one-
person, one-vote cases brought by plaintiffs alleging racial discrimination.
It is primarily because of the importance of these elections to all citi-
zens-and particularly to blacks-that courts should not simply defer to
legislatively-created judicial districts.
Citizens are confined exclusively to the ballot box when exercising judg-
ment over the selection of elected judges.12 3 As a result, the right to cast a
meaningful vote for these positions is particularly important in states
where black voters are heavily concentrated in specific geographical areas
but are outnumbered in the state as a whole. If election officials are al-
lowed to allocate fewer judges to these areas, blacks will be able to exer-
cise little influence over the process of judicial selection, even in areas
where they comprise a supermajority of eligible voters.1 24 Thus, the no-
tion of close scrutiny is particularly appropriate because two fundamental
rights are burdened: the right to vote, and the right of minorities not to be
subjected to discrimination.125
Furthermore, underrepresentation of blacks in judicial districts is espe-
cially troubling when considered within the framework of the legal profes-
sion. Even today, this country has relatively few black attorneys and
121. Courts must also determine whether the current level of deviation is required to achieve the
speedy administration of justice. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
122. Of course, burdensome litigation costs, including those caused by delay or venue changes,
may also dissuade many from filing suits.
123. See Letter from Steve Suitts, Executive Director of the Southern Regional Council, to Profes-
sor Drew S. Days, III (June 28, 1988); cf United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144,
152-53 n.4 (1938) ("[L]egislation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be
expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial
scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of
legislation.").
124. The presence of disproportionate judicial districts undermines the principle that each state
court district, whether populated by white or black voters, is but one equal part of the whole state
court system.
125. See L. TRIBE, supra note 12, § 16-6. All forms of gerrymandering and apportionment are
subject to some level of scrutiny, but the Court has not applied close scrutiny to many of these cases.
See, e.g., Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 340-41, modified, 411 U.S. 922 (1973); Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533 (1964); Casper, Apportionment and the Right to Vote: Standards ofJudicial Scrutiny,
1973 Sup. CT. REV. 1.
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judges.1 2 Some commentators have suggested that the lack of racial diver-
sity in the legal profession has manifested itself in a system of laws that is
unresponsive to the needs of minorities."2 Adopting an electoral system
that broadens the judicial base would help increase the judiciary's aware-
ness of the needs of those historically disadvantaged by the legal profession
and the law. 28 Conversely, if election officials are allowed to apportion
fewer judges to predominantly black areas, blacks will be less able to elect
judges most sensitive to their concerns.
The elective judicial system is also better served when judges comprise a
cross-section of their communities. "A basic tenet of the American legal
system is government of the people-all the people. Therefore, it seems
reasonable to expect that those persons who are primarily responsible for
making the legal system function-our lawyers and judges-represent a
valid cross-section of all the people."12 Broadening the composition of the
bench is especially important because judicial background characteristics
can affect fact-finding and sentencing decisions.1"
Not surprisingly, blacks also participate in elections more frequently
when their votes are counted equally. At least one study has confirmed
that dilutionary elections, for example, lead systematically to a reduction
in black political participation.' It is likely, therefore, that black partici-
126. Only approximately 3% of the nation's attorneys and judges are black, although blacks com-
prise nearly 10% of the workforce. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES: 1988, at 376 (108th ed. 1987); see also Sherman, Is Mississippi Turning?, NAT'L
L.J., Feb. 20, 1989, at 1, 24 ("As of 1986, the last year for which figures are available, there were
only 727 black state court judges, or 2.6 percent of the total .. ").
127. See, e.g., D. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (1987); D. BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND
AMERICAN LAW 207-77 (2d ed. 1980); Coalition of Concerned Black Americans, A Preliminary
Report of the Experience of the Minority Judiciary in the City of ALw York, 18 How. L.J. 495
(1975).
128.
[T]he presence on the bench in visible numbers of well qualified judges drawn from the minor-
ities and women cannot help but add a new dimension of justice to our own courts in most
instances.
These judges cannot help but educate their colleagues by the example they set, by the crea-
tion of precedents, and by informal as well as formal interchange.
Goldman, Should There Be Affirmative Action for the Judiciary?, 62 JUDICATURE 488, 494 (1979).
Cf Spire, The Much Needed and Long Overdue Broadening of the Legal Profession: An Address
from the Bar, 17 CREIGHTON L. REv. 799, 808 (1984) (oppressive nature of law requires diverse
representation within legal profession).
129. The Black Judge in America: A Statistical Profile, 57 JUDICATURE 18, 18 (1973); see
AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, WHOM Do JUDGES REPRESENT? 15 (1981) (quoting Dr. Shel-
don Goldman); Adomeit, Selection by Seniority: How Much Longer Can a Custom Survive that Bars
Blacks and Women from the Connecticut Supreme Court?, 51 CONN. B.J. 295, 321 (1977) ("It
should be as important for blacks and women to be represented in the judiciary as in the legislature or
in the executive department.").
130. See H. JACOB, JUSTICE IN AMERICA 120-23 (3d ed. 1978); Adamany, supra note 102.
131. Latimer, Black Political Representation in Southern Cities, 15 URB. AFF. Q. 65, 80-81
(1979). In this study, voter turnout in the heavily black district of Auburn, Alabama, rose sharply
after dilutionary election schemes were altered. Id. at 80. As a result, blacks were elected to Auburn's
city council for the first time. Id. ("The district election system apparently not only 'allowed' black
representation, it also stimulated black voting turnout.") (citation omitted). Professor Latimer's study
considered the dilutionary effects of "at-large elections"; this term describes voting schemes that com-
bine a number of discrete districts into one electoral unit. See Note, Alternative Voting Systems as
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pation in the process of electing state judges will increase when blacks are
allowed to cast meaningful ballots."3 2
Finally, a diverse judiciary may lead to greater public confidence in the
legal system,1"3 especially among the poor and historically disadvantaged.
Many of these citizens currently regard the American system of justice,
from policeman to judge to warden, as a victimizer of minorities.13 4 Mi-
norities will have more faith in the present system of justice if they are
able to play a meaningful role in the electoral process. 135
CONCLUSION
Courts should afford one-person, one-vote protections to citizens whose
votes have been undervalued in judicial elections because of race. The
adoption of a close scrutiny standard in these elections would comport
with constitutional principles of antidiscrimination derived from the early
one-person, one-vote cases. Such a standard would also close the loophole
left in voting rights law by the recent pronouncements of two courts of
appeals. If state judges are selected by popular election, each citizen must
have an equal opportunity to cast a meaningful ballot. Otherwise, the dis-
enfranchisement of individuals through judicial malapportionment will
continue to vitiate the legitimacy of state judicial institutions.
Remedies for Unlawful At-Large Systems, 92 YALE L.J. 144, 144 n.1, 145 n.8 (1982). At-large elec-
toral schemes do not constitute a per se violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. E.g., Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 142 (1971); Seastrunk v. Bums, 772 F.2d 143,
150 (5th Cir. 1985). These electoral schemes violate the Constitution, however, if they are "conceived
or operated as purposeful devices to further racial discrimination." Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613,
617 (1982) (quoting Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 149).
132. See Note, Affirmative Action and Electoral Reform, 90 YALE L.J. 1811, 1826 (1981) (struc-
tural electoral reform may increase minority representation).
133. AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTrruTE, supra note 129, at 22.
134. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 344 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (racism still
pervasive in administration of justice); Coalition of Concerned Black Americans, supra note 127, at
495-96.
135. Note, supra note 132, at 1826.
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